We use an event-driven process model to specify a version of the High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) protocol between two communicating protocol entities. The protocol is verified using the method of projections. The verification serves as a rigorous exercise to demonstrate the applicability of this method to the analysis of real-life communication protocols.
INTRODUCTION
The High-Level Data Link Control (HDLC) protocol corresponds to a layer 2 protocol within the OSI reference model [7, 8, 9, 23] . It is intended to provide reliable fuU-duplex data transfer between layer 3 protocol entities, using errorprone physical communication channels of layer 1. The specification of HDLC in the ISO documents precisely defines low-level protocol functions, such as error Fig. 1 . The protocol system model. detection and frame synchronization. Formats of three types of frames specifying the encoding of control and data messages are also clearly defined. Aside from these basic definitions, however, the HDLC documents leave many options to be decided by the protocol implementor. In particular, one can choose from a variety of data link configurations and three operational modes that specify balanced or unequal relationships among the communicating entities. Also, various subsets of the messages can be used, instead of the entire set defined. Further, some aspects of HDLC are described informally in English and are not rigorously specified.
In this paper, we use an event-driven process model to specify a version of the HDLC protocol, and then apply the method of projections to verify it [13, 16, 20] . This verification serves as an exercise for demonstrating the applicability of this method (see Figure 1 ). P1 is a primary HDLC entity and P2 a secondary HDLC entity operating in the Asynchronous Response Mode (ARM). C1 and C2 are unreliable communication channels. Our protocol uses the basic repertoire of HDLC commands and responses (with the exception of the CMDR response). It includes the use of poll/final cycles for checkpointing and connection management, timers for timeouts, cyclic sequence numbers and sliding windows of size N for data transfers, and ready/not ready messages for flow control [8] . Our protocol incorporates all of the principal HDLC functions.
Analysis of Multifunction Protocols
The HDLC protocol has at _least three distinguishable functions: connection management, and one-way data transfers in two directions. A multifunction protocol such as HDLC is very complex and cannot be easily analyzed. To reduce the complexity of analysis, an approach that appears attractive is to decompose each protocol entity into modules for handling the different functions of the protocol. For example, each protocol entity in HDLC may be decomposed into three functional modules as shown in Figure 2 . Each module communicates with a corresponding module in the other protocol entity to accomplish one of the three functions. Bochmann and Chung [2] used a decomposition approach to specify a version of the HDLC protocol. However, the decomposition approach does not seem to facilitate analysis of the protocol. The main difficulty is that significant interaction exists among the modules. We identify two types of dependencies. First, modules interact through shared variables within an entity. Second, they also interact because data and control messages sent by different modules in one entity to their respective modules in the other entity are typically encoded in the same protocol message (shared protocol messages).
Most communication protocols that have been rigorously analyzed and presented in the literature are concerned with a single function: either a connection management function [1, 10, 14] or a one-way data transfer function [22, 6, 4] . For example, both safety and liveness properties have been formulated and proved for Stenning's protocol [22, 6 ]. Stenning's protocol is a one-way data transfer protocol. It corresponds to the interaction of a data send module and a data receive module in isolation (see Figure 2) . Any interaction between these modules and other modules is not accounted for. As such, this protocol constitutes just one function of a real-life protocol such as HDLC. The following question arises: Are the safety and liveness properties that are proved for the one-way data transfer protocol still valid when it is implemented as part of a multifunction protocol with the two types of dependencies mentioned above?
We use the method of projections [11, 12, 13, 16, 20] to break up our HDLC protocol analysis problem into smaller problems. The theory of projections is described in [13] and [16] ; we will not go into its details here. The projection method is different from the straightforward approach of decomposing protocol entities into functional modules. The objective is to construct from the given HDLC protocol an image protocol for each of the three functions that are of interest to us (referred to as the projected functions).
An image protocol is specified just like any real protocol. The states, messages and events of entities in an image protocol are obtained by treating groups of states, messages and events in the original protocol as equivalent and aggregating them. As a result, an image protocol is smaller than the original protocol. Any safety property that holds for the image protocol also holds for the original protocol. Additionally, if an image protocol satisfies a well-formed property then it is faithful: Any logical property, safety or liveness, that can be stated for the image protocol holds in the image protocol if and only if it also holds in the original protocol. (Fairness in the scheduling of enabled events in the original protocol system is assumed; that is, no enabled event will be indefinitely delayed [15] .) The objective of our construction procedure is to generate the smallest image protocol that is of sufficient resolution to verify a desired logical property A0 of the projected function. For example, the image protocol that is constructed for HDLC connection management is similar to a handshake protocol [1] . The image protocol for HDLC one-way data transfer is similar to other one-way data transfer protocols based on a sliding window mechanism, but is augmented with initialization and checkpointing features. There are two methods that we use to determine the desired resolution. The first method is applicable when Ao is a safety (including real-time) property. The second method constructs a wellformed image protocol, and is applicable whether A0 is a safety or liveness property. In each method, an initial resolution derived from Ao is successively refined.
The construction of well-formed image protocols involves an examination of protocol entities individually. There is no need to examine the global reachability space of the image protocol interaction or of the original protocol interaction. Given a multifunction protocol (such as HDLC), a well-formed image protocol can always be obtained for each function by increasing its resolution. However, the successful construction of well-formed image protocols that are much smaller than the original multifunction protocol depends upon whether the multifunction protocol has a good structure. Thus, one can think of a multifunction protocol as being well-structured if it possesses small well-formed image protocols for its functions.
Real-Time Behavior
Another important characteristic of real-life communication protocols is that they are time-dependent systems. Real-time constraints (such as bounded response times, packet lifetimes, etc.) exist within individual entities and channels [21] . These local time constraints give rise to global precedence relations between remote events. Such global relations are essential to the correct functioning of the protocol system. The modeling of real-time behavior has usually been neglected in previous protocol analyses.
To verify a time-dependent system, it is necessary to include measures of real time in the modeling of the protocol system. If time is not modeled explicitly, then one is forced to resort to informal arguments about global timing relations in the system. Such informal arguments are inadequate and are the source of many protocol system design errors [3] .
The real-time behavior of communication protocols has implications regarding the formulation of liveness assertions. Typically, if a protocol does not achieve progress (transfer of data, establishment of a connection, etc.) within a bounded time duration T, then the protocol resorts to some alternative action (abort, reset, retransmission, etc.). The protocol will not wait for a finite but unbounded amount of time. Hence, a temporal logic liveness assertion [6] such as "eventually, a data block will be transferred" is not realistic. More appropriate is a real-time specification such as "if within a time duration T the data block is not transferred then at least n retransmissions of the data block have occurred, all of which failed, and the protocol has reset."
We model measures of time by incorporating time variables and time events into our protocol system model [17] . With time variables and time events, the real-time behavior of communication protocols can be stated by safety assertions; temporal logic liveness assertions are not needed.
Summary of This Paper
In Section 2, we first describe an event-driven process model of a protocol system. Each component (entity or channel) of the protocol system is modeled as an event-driven process that manipulates a set of variables local to itself and interacts with adjacent components by message passing. The model includes several realistic protocol features such as multifield messages and the use of timers. This model is then used to specify the HDLC protocol.
In Section 3, we apply the method of projections to verify the HDLC protocol. In Section 3.1, we outline the definition of image protocols and two methods for obtaining image protocols. In Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we construct from the given HDLC protocol an image protocol for each of the three functions that are of interest to us. For each image protocol, we obtain invariant safety assertions concerning some desired logical behavior of the projected function. From the properties of image protocols these assertions also hold for the entire HDLC protocol.
Of the three image protocols obtained, the image protocol for connection management is well-formed. However, the image protocols for the one-way data transfers are not well-formed. In order for these data transfer image protocols to be well-formed, they have to be made substantially larger to account for dependencies in the HDLC protocol between the two one-way data transfer functions.
In Section 3.5, we describe a minor modification to the HDLC protocol that allows small well-formed image protocols to be constructed for each of the oneway data transfer functions, as well as for the connection management function. The invariant safety assertions obtained in Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 continue to hold for the connection management and data transfer image protocols of the modified HDLC protocol. The HDLC protocol with this modification can be regarded as a well-structured protocol.
AN HDLC/ARM PROTOCOL
In this section, we describe the HDLC/ARM protocol for two protocol entities. ARM denotes the Asynchronous Response Mode of operation. Let P1 be the primary HDLC entity, and let P2 be the secondary HDLC entity. P1 sends messages to P2 using channel C1, and P2 sends messages to P1 using channel C2 (see Figure 1 ). There is a user at entity P1 and a user at entity P2. The HDLC protocol system offers the users a reliable connection that (a) can be opened/ closed by the user at P1, and (b) when open, allows each user to send data blocks to the other user in sequence (without loss, duplication or reordering).
Assumptions about the Environment
To obtain assertions about the logical behavior of the protocol system, a few assumptions are needed about the environment in which HDLC operates. At any time, channel Ci contains a (possibly empty) sequence of messages sent by Pi, for i = 1 and i = 2. Messages in the channels may be corrupted by noise, but not reordered or duplicated. When Pi sends a message, that message is appended to the tail of the message sequence in Ci. When channel Ci is not empty, the first message (at the head of the message sequence) can be removed and passed on to Pj (j # i), provided that the message is not corrupted. If the message is corrupted, it is deleted and not passed on to Pj (we assume a perfect error-detection mechanism). The frame-level functions of HDLC [7] , such as the frame formatting of HDLC messages, bit insertion/deletion to make flags unique, error detecting, etc., are not considered as part of the entities P1 and P2, but have been included in the channel model. Finally, messages in the channels have a bounded lifetime. The first message in channel Ci is deleted if it has been in the channel for a specified time, denoted by MaxDelay~.
Event-Driven Process Model
Each component of the protocol system (i.e., protocol entity or channel) is modeled as an event-driven process that manipulates a set of variables local to itself and interacts with adjacent components by message passing. The events of an entity consist of message sends, message receptions and changes internal to the entity. The events of a channel correspond to transformations on the channel message sequence. An event can occur only if variables of the protocol system satisfy certain conditions, referred to as the enabling condition of the event.
When an enabled event occurs, variables of the protocol system are affected. Whenever an event-driven process has enabled events, any one of them can occur.
Time Variables and Time Events.
In HDLC, each protocol entity guarantees certain constraints on the time intervals between occurrences of events involving that entity. Also, recall that messages in channels have bounded lifetimes. Because (physical) time elapses at the same rate everywhere, these time constraints give rise to precedence relations between remote events in different components. Furthermore, these precedence relations are vital to the proper functioning of the HDLC protocol. We cannot adequately model such a time-dependent system by using only entity and channel events. It is necessary to relate the elapsed times measured at different components. We do this by introducing time variables in the components to measure elapsed time in integer ticks, and time events to age the time variables [16, 17] .
Each time variable takes its values from Nt = (Off, 0, 1, 2,... }. A time variable is termed inactive if its value is Off; otherwise it is termed active. The value of a time variable can be changed in only two ways. First, it can be aged by a time event. When an active time variable is aged its value is incremented by 1; when an inactive time variable is aged its value is not affected. Second, a time variable in a component can be reset to any value in Nt by a system event involving that component. Thus, for an active time variable, the difference between its current value and the value it was last reset to indicates the time elapsed since the last reset.
We will use two types of time variables in our model: global time variables and local time variables. All global time variables in a system model are aged by the same time event, referred to as the global time event. Thus, all active global time variables are coupled. The global time event models the elapse of physical time in the protocol system model. Global time variables are typically used to model time constraints that are satisfied by components without the use of timers.
Local time variables are used to model the timers that are implemented in system components. To each local time variable t there is a unique local time event that ages t (and t alone). Thus, t is not directly coupled to any other time variable. To specify its accuracy, we associate with t a global time variable t* and a reset value to. Whenever t is reset, both t* and to are reset to the same value, t* is affected by the global time event like any other global time variable. The accuracy of local time variable t is specified by its accuracy axiom which bounds t -t* at any time. For example, the accuracy axiom I t -t* I ---1 + a (t* -to) can specify a timer with maximum relative error a in its clock frequency (Off -Off is treated as 0).
In this model, neither the local time event of t nor the global time event can occur if such an occurrence would violate the accuracy axiom. By placing additional constraints on the set of allowed values for time variables, other types of time constraints satisfied by a component can be modeled. For example, let t be a time variable that is reset to 0 by event el and reset to Off by event e2. Let D be a specified delay. Then, to model the time constraint that e2 occurs no later than D time units since the occurrence of el, we include (t < D) in the enabling condition of the time event of t. Such constraints on time events are known as time axioms. (For a more detailed presentation, the reader is referred to [16] of variables, each with a specified domain of values. Some of these variables can be auxiliary variables used only in specification/verification of the protocol system. Also, some of these variables can be time variables used in modeling time constraints satisfied by the entity.
In channel Ci, we associate with every message in transit a global time value that indicates the time spent by that message in the channel. This time value is referred to as the age of the message. For channel Ci, we define Channeli as the variable that represents, at any time, the sequence of (message, age) pairs in Ci.
Events of the Protocol Model.
The events of the protocol system model can be categorized into entity events, channel events, and time events. We will describe them in that order. There are three types of entity events. We describe these events for entity Pi. 3. An internal event of P~ involves no messages. It is enabled if the entity variables of Pi satisfy a specified predicate. Its occurrence updates the values of the entity variables. Internal events are used to model interactions of the entity with its local user or channel controller, as well as timeouts and other internal transitions of the entity.
Note that both send and receive events affect the state of a channel, as well as the state of the entity.
We now describe the channel events. For i = 1 and i = 2, the channel loss event for channel Ci is enabled whenever Channeli is not empty. Its occurrence deletes the first (message, age) pair in Channeli. ( Channeli that exceeds MaxDelayi for i= 1 and i = 2.
For each entity, we assume mutual exclusion between the occurrence of events of that entity. Furthermore, we assume that simultaneous occurrences of events in different components of the protocol system can be represented as an arbitrary sequence of occurrences of the same events. This latter assumption is reasonable because events in communication protocol systems can usually be defined in such a way that their occurrences are instantaneous.
HDLC Messages
Messages sent by P~.
Each of the message types of P1 has a Poll bit-field (abbreviated as P field) that can take the value 0 or 1. Any message with the P field set to 1 is referred to as a Poll. from P2. The NR field is the receive sequence number and has been described above.
Messages sent by P2.
Each of the message types of P2 has a Final bit-field (abbreviated as F field} that can take the value 0 or 1. Any message with the F field set to 1 is referred to as a Final. P2 responds to a received Poll by sending a Final at the earliest opportunity.
(U, F, Response)
This U message type represents the Unnumbered frames sent by Pe. The Response field can take the value UA or DM. UA stands for Unnumbered Acknowledgement, and is sent to acknowledge reception of and compliance with a U command received from P1. DM stands for Disconnected Mode, and is sent when P2 is off-line as a response to any message (except for SARM) received from P1.
(I, F, Data, NS, NR )
This I message type represents Information frames sent by P2. The Data, NS and NR fields are similar to those in the I frames sent by P~ {except that the roles of P1 and P2 are interchanged}. Also, an I frame with the F field set to 1 indicates that P2 is ready to receive data from P1.
(S, F, RStatus, NR)
This S message type represents Supervisory frames sent by P2. The RStatus and NR fields are similar to those in the S frames sent by P~ {except that the roles of P1 and P2 are interchanged).
Note that message types sent by P1 and Pe have similar names. This should, however, cause no confusion. (The P and F fields actually occupy the same bit position in HDLC frames. That bit is referred to as the P/F bit [7] .)
Variables of the HDLC Protocol Entities

Variables of P1.
P~, the primary HDLC entity, has the following variables (the domain of each variable is also listed using a Pascal-like notation). Figure 3b) . User_out points to the data block to be next delivered to the local user. R points to where the Note that many variables in P1 and P2 have the same names. Wherever this might cause ambiguity, we qualify the variable names with numerical subscripts, for instance, Model and Mode2.
Events of the HDLC Protocol
The events of the HDLC protocol system are formally specified in Tables I-V (all tables may be found in Appendix B). (A prose description can be found in [19] .) The events of the entities are shown in Tables I and II . The program statements in upper case {POLL_SENT, FINAL_RECEIVED, INITIALIZE_ SEND_VARIABLES, etc.) stand for code segments that are shown in Table III . When used in an entity event, the variables they refer to are the variables of that entity. We use the notation @ and @ to refer to addition modulo N and subtraction modulo N respectively. Poll_ Timer (in P1) has the accuracy axiom The channel events are specified in Table IV . The time events of the HDLC protocol are specified in Table V . Poll-Timer_ Tick is the local time event for Poll_ Timer. Global_Tick is the global time event of the system. The procedure Age (in the actions of the time events) ages all its time variable arguments by one tick. Note that the global time event cannot age $Response_ Time beyond MaxResponseTime, nor can it cause a message to stay in Channeli for longer than MaxDelay, nor can it cause Poll_ Timer to be more inaccurate than as specified by its accuracy axiom. Similarly Poll_ Timer_ Tick cannot cause Poll_ Timer to be more inaccurate than as specified by its accuracy axiom.
The initial state of the HDLC protocol system is given by the following value assignments to the protocol system variables: both Channel1 and Channel2 are empty; entity variables have the initial values specified in Section 2.4. Note that some of the entity variables concerned primarily with data transfer functions are not initialized until the data link is opened (Mode set to the value of Open).
IMAGE PROTOCOLS AND SAFETY PROPERTIES
The HDLC protocol described offers three distinguishable functions to the users: connection management, and one-way data transfers in two directions. We would like to examine the logical behavior of the HDLC protocol with respect to these functions.
We note that these three functions are not independent of each other. Dependencies of the two types described in Section 1.1 (shared variables and shared protocol messages) are present. We mention some of them here. First, the Poll/ Final cycle (a handshaking mechanism in the protocol) is used by all three functions; that is, Poll and Final messages, Poll_bit, Poll_Timer, Poll_Retry_ Count and Final_ bit are shared by all three functions. Second, the connection management function interacts with the data transfer functions at opening (when the data transfer variables are initialized), and at closing {when data transfer is inhibited); the variable Mode in each entity, and the SARM, DISC and UA messages are shared by all three functions. Third, the data transfers in the two directions interact through I frames that carry data in one direction and acknowledgment for data in the opposite direction. In addition, an incoming I frame with the Poll (Final) field set to 1 conveys flow control information for outgoing data.
Such dependencies present major obstacles for protocol analysis using a decomposition approach. We use the approach of protocol projections to obtain an image protocol for each function. In Section 3.1, we outline a procedure for constructing image protocols of sufficient resolution to verify desired logical properties of individual functions. We also briefly describe how to obtain inductively complete assertions that imply desired safety properties.
An assertion is inductively complete for a protocol system if (a) the initial condition of the protocol system satisfies the assertion, and (b) for each event in the protocol, given that the assertion holds before the event occurrence, the enabling condition and the action of the event are sufficient to show that the assertion holds after the event occurrence. In Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, we use the approach outlined in Section 3.1 to obtain image protocols for each of the HDLC functions, and state inductively complete assertions that imply some desired safety properties.
In Section 3.5, we describe a minor modification to HDLC that allows us to obtain small well-formed image protocols for the three functions of interest. The modification involves the addition of a one-bit flow control field to the HDLC information frames. These well-formed image protocols are faithful to the HDLC protocol. (We have not, however, investigated liveness properties of the HDLC protocol or of our modified version of the HDLC protocol in this paper.) We propose that this modified HDLC protocol can be considered to be well-structured.
Verification Via Projections
In this section, we briefly outline the method of protocol projections. In Section 3.1.1, we define image protocols. In Section 3.1.2, we describe two iterative methods for generating an image protocol of sufficient resolution to verify a specified property A0 of a given function. For a detailed and formal presentation of the theory and methodology, see [13, 16, 20] .
3.1.1. Image Protocol Definition. An image protocol is defined with respect to a given subset of entity variables of the original protocol. For i = 1 and i --2, let Vi denote the set of entity variables of Pi in the HDLC protocol, and let V~ denote the subset of Vi representing the entity variables of an image protocol. Messages and events of the image protocol are defined based on V~ and V~_.
Each value assignment to the variables in Vi represents a state s of entity Pi. Each HDLC entity event specifies a set of entity state transitions (which involve messages in the case of send and receive events). For example, the Send_M event, which involves variables in Vi and fields in _F, specifies transitions of the form (s, r, (M, _f)); that is, when Pi is in some state s satisfying the enabling condition of Send_M, the action of Send_M leaves Pi in some state r and sends [16] .)
The image message types and the image entity events serve as the message types and entity events of the image protocol. Also, image message types and image entity events that have no effect on variables in V~ and V~ are eliminated in the image protocol; those that have identical effects are merged. The behavior of the communication channels is the same in the image protocol system as in the HDLC protocol system. The initial values of the image protocol variables are the same as the initial values of the corresponding HDLC variables.
An image protocol as constructed above captures only part of the behavior of the original protocol. However, we have shown that a safety property that holds in the image protocol also holds in the original protocol. Also, well-formed image protocols are faithful to the original protocol in all of their safety and liveness properties. Informally, an image protocol is well-formed if the following holds: in the image protocol, if an entity event e' takes the entity from state r' to state s' and involves message m', then in the original protocol, from every entity state r whose image is r' there is a sequence of entity events that will take the original protocol to a state where an event e whose image is e' can occur [13, 16] .
We have not investigated liveness properties of the HDLC protocol. We can decide whether certain states will be eventually reached (a typical liveness assertion) by examining the execution paths of the system. The expressive power of our model for such liveness assertions is limited, when compared with models that incorporate temporal logic semantics [15] . Recall however that communication protocols are time-dependent systems, and that progress properties of such systems can be stated as safety assertions involving time variables.
3.1.2.
Constructing an Image Protocol of Desired Resolution. We next describe an iterative method that attempts to find the smallest image protocol that is of sufficient resolution to verify a desired safety property A0 of the projected function.
For i = 1 and i = 2, let V~ denote the entity variables of Pi that appear in the assertion Ao. We first describe the iterative step. Construct an image protocol using V~ and V~ as the set of entity variables. Verify if assertion A0 holds in this image protocol (see below). If it does, then from the properties of image protocols A0 holds in the HDLC protocol and the verification is over. If A0 does not hold in the image protocol, then there is a sequence of events, referred to as a test sequence, that takes the image protocol from its initial condition to global state that violates A0 (see below). Consider the event sequences in the HDLC protocol that have images equal to the test sequence. If any of these HDLC event sequences can occur in the HDLC protocol, then A0 does not hold in the HDLC protocol, and the verification is over. If none of these HDLC event sequences can occur, that is because some HDLC variables (not included in V~ U V~) inhibit certain events from occurring. Include these variables in V~ and repeat the above iterative step until termination. In the worst case, termination occurs with the image protocol being equal to the original protocol.
Although this approach may at first appear to be inefficient, since in each iteration we check whether A0 holds for an image protocol, this is in fact not the case because at each iteration, even if we cannot verify A0, we can usually establish properties of the image protocol that are helpful in verifying Ao. (For example, the image protocol may not transfer data correctly, but it does ensure correct Poll/Final handshake and data link initialization.) Since each succeeding image protocol is a refinement of all earlier image protocols, these properties, once established, need not be verified again.
To verify A0 for an image protocol, we do an iterative search for an inductively complete safety assertion A that implies A0. Initially A equals A0. The iterative step is as follows. For each event e of the image protocol, determine the weakest precondition [5] that must hold before the occurrence of e in order that A holds immediately after the occurrence of e. Let C denote the conjunction of A and all the weakest preconditions. If C is equivalent to A and the initial state of the image protocol satisfies C, then A is inductively complete, A0 holds for the image protocol, and the search is over. If the initial state of the image protocol does not satisfy C, then by examining the trace of the iterations, a test sequence can be determined that takes the image protocol from its initial state to a state violating A0. In this case, Ao does not hold and the search is over.
If neither of the above conditions holds, then replace A by C and repeat the iteration. If at any point we determine (by inspection) that a safety property T holds for the image protocol, then A can be replaced by the conjunction of A and T. This speeds up the search by constraining the weakest preconditions.
The above iterative method can be used only for verifying safety assertions. A variation on this method can be used when A0 is either a safety or liveness assertion. In this second method, each image protocol that is obtained is tested for well-formedness (instead of testing whether A0 holds). If the test for wellformedness fails, then the failure will point out additional HDLC entity variables to include in constructing the next image protocol. Repeat this step until a wellformed image protocol is obtained. Since well-formed image protocols are faithful, any outcome which results from verifying A0 on the image protocol is valid for the original protocol.
Note that the check for well-formedness involves an examination of each protocol entity individually. It does not involve an analysis of the global interaction of the intermediate image protocols. Hence, this checking can be performed efficiently. On the other hand, given a safety assertion Ao, the image protocol resulting from the first method is usually smaller (never larger) than that obtained from the second method. Since real-life communication protocols are typically time-dependent systems with real-time specifications stated as safety properties, the first method is usually more useful in practice.
Image Protocol for Connection Management
The first image protocol we show is for the connection management function. A desirable property of the HDLC protocol with respect to this function may be stated as follows:
This property can be stated using only the variables Mode in PI and Mode in P2-Starting from this initial set of entity variables, and applying the first method, we determine that the following variables are also needed: Poll_ bit, Poll_ Timer, SPoil_Timer and Poll_Retry_Count in P1; Final_bit, $Response_Time and U_Response in P2. The resulting image protocol (described below) is also wellformed--using the second method would result in the same image protocol.
The images of the HDLC message types can now be defined as follows. First, there are the message types sent by P1. The image of message type (U, P, Command) is defined by (U', P, Command) (i.e., all the fields of the U Message type are needed in the image protocol). The image of both (I, P, Data, NS, NR) and (S, P, RStatus, NR) can be defined by (I' P) where I' denotes a (new) message type that corresponds to either an I or an S frame of the HDLC protocol. The entity events of the image protocol are displayed in Tables VI and VII. The channel and time events of the image protocol are exactly as the channel and time events shown in Tables IV and V for the HDLC protocol. These events are obtained by taking the images of the corresponding events of the HDLC protocol (Tables I, II , IV and V). In the event Send_U' of Table VI, the enabling condition and action are the same as in the event Send_ U of Table I, except that U is replaced by U'. This notation is also used in the remaining tables.
The initial state of this image protocol is obtained from the HDLC protocol: Model = Mode2 = Closed, U_Response = None, Poll_ Timer = $Poll_ Timer ---$Response_ Time = Off, Poll_bit = Final_bit = 0, Poll_Retry_Count --0, and Channell and Channel2 are empty.
The reader is referred to [16] for additional details.
Safety properties.
For this image protocol, the following assertion concerning the Poll/Final cycle has been shown to be inductively complete, hence invariant. (A proof can be found in Appendix A. It is shown as an illustration of our technique. Proofs of other assertions to be introduced below are omitted for brevity.) In the assertions, SAge denotes the age of the associated message in the channel. For this image protocol, the conjunction of the PF assertions and the following assertions concerning connection management are inductively complete, hence invariant (proof in [16, 18] ). 
Poll/Final (PF) Assertions.
PF1. Poll_ bit = 1 ~ Poll_
Connection Management ( CM) Assertions.
CM1. (a)
Image Protocol for P1 to P2 Data Transfer
We now consider the function of one-way data transfer from P1 to P2. Two desirable properties of the HDLC protocol with respect to this function may be stated as follows.
The first property states that data is transferred in sequence; the second that the maximum number of outstanding data blocks (and therefore the minimum storage requirement) at P~ is N -1. These properties can be stated using only the variables Mode, Source, A and S in P~, and Mode, Sink and User_out at P2. Starting from this initial set of entity variables, and applying the first method, we determine that the following variables are needed: Poll_bit, Poll_Timer, $Poll_ Timer, Poll_Retry_ Count, User_ in, VS, VA, VCS, Checkpoint_ Cycle and Remote_RStatus in P1, and Final_ bit, $Response_ Time, U_Response, R, VR and Local_RStatus in P2. The resulting image protocol (described below) has sufficient resolution to verify the desired safety property. However, it is not wellformed. In fact, we have shown in [16] that to obtain a well-formed image protocol for this function, we would have to include almost the entire HDLC protocol.
We now define the images of the HDLC message types sent by P1. The image of message type (U, P, Command) is (U', P, Command). The image of (I, P, Data, NS, NR) is defined as (I', P, Data, NS), where I' is a new message type that corresponds to an I frame of the HDLC protocol. The image of (S, P, RStatus, NR) is (S', P), where S' is a new message type corresponding to an S frame of the HDLC protocol.
Next, we define the images of the HDLC message types sent by P2. The events of the image protocol system are obtained by taking the images of the HDLC protocol system [16] . The events of the protocol entities in the image protocol are shown in Tables VIII and IX. The channel and time events for this protocol are exactly as described in Tables IV and V. The initial state of this protocol is the same as that of the HDLC protocol.
We note that the image protocol does in fact display a minor liveness property that the original protocol does not have: the number of I' frames in channel C2 can exceed N. In fact, the Send_I' event of P2 is the only event that causes the image protocol not to be well-formed [16] . In Section 3.5, we suggest a minor modification to HDLC that will correct this and allow us to construct small wellformed image protocols for the one-way data transfer functions, as well as for the connection management function.
3.3.1. Safety Properties. For this image protocol, we have verified (by using the method described in Section 3.1.2) the desired safety properties of the projected function.
Notation.
We first describe some notation that is used in the assertion. Recall that Channel1 and Channel2 represent the sequence of messages in C1 and C2 respectively. We shall think of Channell (Channel2) as a sequence of messages from left to right; the tail of Channel~ (Channel2) is at the left, and the head of Channell (Channel2) is at the right. When Channel1 (Channel2) contains only one message, the tail and the head point to the same message.
The following notation is used in describing the state of Channel1. Given integers s and vs such that s _> 0 and 0 _< vs < N, the notation (s, vs) denotes the tuple (I', Data, NS), where Data contains Source [s] and NS contains vs. Let _x be a sequence whose elements are either U' frames or entries of the form (s, vs). Channel1 is said to satisfy x_, if, by deleting all S' frames in Channel~ and by deleting the P field in all r frames in Channel~, the resulting sequence equals _x. Given two consecutive elements x~, x2 in _x, we say that a Poll is to the immediate left of x2 to mean that it is in between x2 and xl. We say that a Poll is to the left of x2 to mean that it is anywhere to the left of x2.
Given integers n, s and vs such that 0 _< n __ s and 0 _< vs < N, the notation (s -1, vs e 1)..(s -n, vs e n) denotes the sequence (s-1, vs e 1), (s -2, vs e 2), ..., is -n, vs e n) ifn > 0, and the empty sequence ifn = 0. Either way, n is the length of the sequence. (We use a simple comma to denote concatenation.)
Finally, whenever the term [Old_Info_Sequence] appears in the assertions, it denotes any sequence (possibly empty) of entries of the form is, vs). We use [Old_Info_Sequence] to refer to the is, vs ) sequence obtained from the r frames in Channel1 pertaining to a data connection that is in the process of being reset.
The following notation is used in describing the state of Channel2. Given an integer vr such that 0 _ vr < N, the notation [vr] denotes either an empty sequence or any sequence of one or more receive sequence numbers, each equalling vr. Let y_ be a sequence whose elements are either U' frames or entries of the form [vr] . An instance of y_ is any sequence of U' frames and NR fields obtained by (arbitrarily) fixing the length of each [vr] in y_. Channel2 is said to satisfy y_ if, by replacing all S' and r frames in Channel2 by their NR fields, the resulting sequence equals an instance of y_.
Given integers m and vr such that m _ 0 and 0 _ vr < N, the notation [vr] sequence obtained from the r and S' frames in Channel2 pertaining to a data connection that is in the process of being reset.
Lastly, (Final, NR) denotes an I' or S' frame whose F field equals I and whose receive sequence number equals NR.
Data Transfer Assertions.
The assertions A1-A6 listed below, in conjunction with the PF assertions, are inductively complete, and hence invariant (proof appears in [16, 18] . A1-A5 are concerned with conditions that hold during opening/closing of the data link; A6 is concerned with conditions of data transfer that hold when the data link is open. (P1 has determined the current value of R exactly. Hence ( S -j, VS e j ), the first of the new r frames in Channel~, is the one next expected by P2.} (d) (There is no Poll in Channel1 with or to the right of (So -1, VSo e 1)) and Final_ bit = 0 and no Final in Channel2. (Since (So -1, VSo e 1) was the last I' frame sent before retransmission was initiated through checkpointing, the Poll is either not outstanding or has been sent after (So -1, VSo e 1) was sent.} 
Image Protocol for P2 to P1 Data Transfer
We now consider the function of one-way data transfer from P2 to P~. Two desirable properties of the HDLC protocol concerning this function may be stated as follows:
The first property states that data is transferred in sequence; the second that the maximum number of outstanding data blocks (hence the minimum storage requirement) at P2 is N -1. These properties can be stated using only the variables Mode, Sink, and User_out at P1, and Mode, Source, S and A at P2. As in the case of the P1 to P2 data transfer, we can construct an image protocol using the The images of message types sent by P1 can be defined as follows. The image of message type (U, P, Command) is (U', P, Command). The image of (I, P, Data, NS, NR) is defined as (I', P, NR), where I' is a new message type corresponding to an I frame in the HDLC protocol. The image of (S, P, RStatus, NR) is (S', P, RStatus NR).
Next we consider the images of the HDLC message types sent by P2. The image of (U, F, Response) is (U', F, Response). The image of (I, F, Data, NS, NR) is (I', F, Data, NS), where I' is a new message type corresponding to an I frame of the HDLC protocol. The image of (S', F, RStatus, NR) is (S', F), where S' is a new message type corresponding to an S frame of the HDLC protocol.
Thus, in the image protocol, (U', P, Command), (I', P, NR) and (S', F, RStatus, NR) are the message types sent by P1, and (U', F, Response), (I', F, Data, NS), and (S', F) are the message types sent by P2.
The events of P1 and P2 are shown in Tables X and XI, satisfies (U', 1, UA) , [Old_Info_Sequence] and Mode2 = Closed and Model = Closing) or (Channel2 satisfies (S -1, VS e 1) .. (0, 0), (U', 1, UA), [ Old_Info_Sequence] and 
D5. (a) Channel2 satisfies ( S -1, VS e 1) .. ( S -n, VS e n)
where 0 _< n _ S -R. Final is with ( S -j, VS e j ).
A Proposed Modification to HDLC
We observed above that HDLC protocol cannot be considered to be well-structured, since it does not have well-formed image protocols that are significantly smaller than the HDLC protocol itself for all of its functions. We will now introduce a minor modification to the I message in the HDLC protocol. This modification allows us to obtain small well-formed image protocols for each of the one-way data transfer functions. Our modification consists of adding an RStatus field to the HDLC I message type. In place of the message type (I, P, Data, NS, NR) sent by Pi, we will use the message type (IM, P, Data, NS, NR, RStatus), where IM (standing for I modified) is the name of the message type. In place of the message type (I, F, Data, NS, NR) sent by P2, we will use the message type (IM, F, Data, NS, NR, RStatus). Note that the RStatus field can be implemented using a field of one bit.
The usage of this IM message type is similar to the usage of the HDLC I message type, except for the following difference. The P field being set to 1 does not indicate any flow control information; instead, the RStatus field is used to convey flow control information exactly as in an S frame. The events of this modified HDLC protocol system are shown in Tables XII and XIII. Note that the only difference between this modified HDLC protocol and the original HDLC protocol (Tables I and II) is that Send_I and Rec_I have been replaced by Send_ IM and Rec_IM, respectively. This modified HDLC protocol possesses small well-formed image protocols for each of its functions [16] and can be considered to be well-structured.
In particular, the image protocol obtained for connection management in Section 3.2 (Tables VI and VII) is still valid and well-formed (where I' is now the image of IM and S).
In the image protocol for one-way data transfer from P1 to P2, we have the same entity variables as before (Section 3.3). The message type U is not changed in the image protocol (as before). The image of message types IM and S sent by el are I' and S' respectively, as already defined. The message types IM and S sent by P2 are both projected onto the same image message type S (i.e., the Data and NS fields in IM are deleted). The events of P1 (P2) in the image protocol are exactly as shown in Table VIII (Table IX) , except that Rec_I'(Send_I') is missing. This image protocol can easily be shown to be well-formed [16] .
The image protocol for one-way data transfer from P2 to P1 can be similarly constructed. The entity variables of P1 and P2 in the image protocol are as defined in Section 3.4. The message types IM and S sent by P1 are both projected onto the same message type S. The message types IM and S sent by P2 have the images I' and S' respectively as already defined. The events of P1 (P2) in the image protocol are exactly as shown in Table X (Table XI) , except that Send_I' (Rec_I') is missing. This image protocol can easily be shown to be well-formed.
The connection management assertions obtained in Section 3.2.1, and the data transfer assertions obtained in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.4.1 continue to be invariant for the image protocols of this modified HDLC protocol. In addition, because these image protocols are well-formed, they are faithful to the modified HDLC protocol.
CONCLUSION
We have specified a version of the HDLC protocol using an event-driven process model, and verified it using the method of projections. The verification serves as a rigorous exercise in demonstrating the applicability of our method to the analysis of real-life protocols.
The HDLC protocol specified is based upon the Asynchronous Response Mode (ARM) of operation between two protocol entities, and includes all of its important features. It uses the basic repertoire of HDLC commands and responses (with the exception of the CMDR response), and includes the use of poll/final messages for checkpointing and connection management, timers for timeouts, cyclic sequence numbers, sliding windows of size N for data transfers, and ready/ not ready messages for flow control.
The HDLC protocol has two characteristics found in most real-life communication protocols. First, the HDLC protocol is a time-dependent system, that is, HDLC operates under real-time constraints that are important not only for the protocol's performance efficiency but also for its correct logical behavior. Such time-dependent behavior cannot be handled by liveness assertions of the temporal logic variety. By including time variables and time events in our protocol model, we specify the HDLC time-dependent behavior in terms of safety assertions.
Second, HDLC is a multifunction protocol. It implements three distinguishable functions: connection management, and one-way data transfers between two protocol entities. Using the method of projections, we have constructed for each function an image protocol containing only those portions of the HDLC protocol that are needed to verify the desired correctness properties of that function. In each case, an inductively complete assertion implying the desired behavior was obtained.
Of the three image protocols obtained, only the connection management image protocol is well-formed. In order to construct a well-formed image protocol for one-way data transfer, almost the entire HDLC protocol has to be included in the image. This is due to dependencies in the two data transfer functions of HDLC. Thus, we say that the HDLC protocol as currently specified is not wellstructured. We then introduced a minor modification to the HDLC protocol, in the form of an additional one-bit flow control field in the HDLC I frame format. With this modification, small well-formed image protocols can be constructed for each of the HDLC functions of interest. Our modified version of HDLC can be considered as as well-structured protocol. Initially, Poll_ bit = O, Poll_ Timer = Off, Final_ bit = O, $Response_ Time = Off, and the channels are empty. Hence, PF2 holds nonvacuously, while the rest of the PF assertions hold vacuously. We will next show that the PF assertions are true after the occurrence of any event, provided that they are true before the event occurrence. This will then establish the PF assertions as a system invariant.
We first introduce some notation that is used in the proof. The name of a variable will be used to denote its value before the occurrence of an event. We will now consider each of the events of the image protocol system and show that the PF assertions are not violated by any of them.
Entity events of P1. User_req_conn and User_req_disc do not affect any of the PF assertions.
In order to send a Poll (using either Send_U' or Send_Y), the condition Poll_ bit = 1 must hold. From PF1 and PF2, this means that there is no Poll in Entity events of P2. The reception of Poll (either a U' or an I' frame) means that PF3 held nonvacuously. Also, from the local time axiom for channel C~ we have that $Poll_ Timer = SAge <-MaxDelay~. After the reception of the Final, Final_bit = 1 and $Response_ Time = 0. Hence PF4 holds nonvacuously after the event. The other PF assertions hold vacuously.
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